Day 14 – Nixon on the World Stage: Change and Continuities over time

Directions: Divide the foreign policy speeches made by Nixon from 1969 to 1974 among your group members. Each group member should read and annotate their respective speech. Discuss each speech and identify the following.

- Two ways in which the Nixon administration deviated from the policies of earlier presidents
- Two ways the Nixon administration continued policies of earlier administrations
- Three changes that occurred during the Nixon administration
- Three continuities regarding foreign policy that persisted throughout his administration

For each, provide evidence from the speeches to support your claims and explain why each change and continuity occurred.

Individually write a paragraph that satisfies the 2 point requirement of the long essay rubric for change and continuity

**CCOT:**

1 Point

Describes historical continuity AND change over time.

1 Point

Explains the reasons for historical continuity AND change over time.

**NIXON TAKES OFFICE: January 1969**

Richard Nixon, Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen July 25, 1969

THE PRESIDENT. [1.] As Ron Ziegler [Press Secretary] has already told you, the remarks today will be for attribution but not direct quotation, and for background. 1

... UNITED STATES ROLE IN ASIA

... I think what would be of greatest interest to you before we go to your questions is to give you the perspective that I have with regard to Asia and America's role in Asia.

... Insofar as the general purpose of a trip like this, I can understand some of the speculation to the effect that: Why does a President of the United States think he learns anything by spending 1 day each in an Asian country--or, for that matter, as we did earlier, in a European country?

... Now, a word about what is a very consuming interest in Asia. A consuming interest, I say, because it is one that I have had for a number of years, and one that now, as I look at the perspective of history, becomes even more imperative.

The United States is going to be facing, we hope before too long--no one can say how long, but before too long--a major decision: What will be its role in Asia and in the Pacific after the end of the war in Vietnam? We will be facing that decision, but also the Asian nations will be wondering about what that decision is.

When I talked to Prime Minister Gorton [of Australia], for example, he indicated, in the conversations he had had with a number of Asian leaders, they all wondered whether the United States, because of its frustration over the war in Vietnam, because of its earlier frustration over the war in Korea--... would withdraw from the Pacific and play a minor role.

This is a decision that will have to be made, of course, as the war comes to an end. But the time to develop the thinking which will go into that decision is now. I think that one of the weaknesses in American foreign policy is that too often we react rather precipitately to events as they occur. We fail to have the perspective and the long-range view which is essential for a policy that will be viable.

As I see it, even though the war in Vietnam has been, as we all know, a terribly frustrating one, and, as a result of that frustration, even though there would be a tendency for many Americans to say, "After we are through with that, let's not become involved in Asia," I am convinced that the way to avoid becoming involved in another war in Asia is for the United States to continue to play a significant role.

I think the way that we could become involved would be to attempt withdrawal, because, whether we like it or not, geography makes us a Pacific power. And when we consider, for example, that Indonesia at its closest point is only 14 miles from the Philippines, when we consider that Guam, where we are...
presently standing, of course, is in the heart of Asia, when we consider the interests of the whole Pacific as they relate to Alaska and Hawaii, we can all realize this.

As we look at Asia today, we see that the major world power which adopts a very aggressive attitude and a belligerent attitude in its foreign policy, Communist China, of course, is in Asia, and we find that the two minor world powers—minor, although they do have significant strength as we have learned—that most greatly threaten the peace of the world, that adopt the most belligerent foreign policy, are in Asia, North Korea and, of course, North Vietnam.

When we consider those factors, I think, realize that if we are thinking down the road, down the long road—not just 4, 5 years, but 10, 15 or 20—that if we are going to have peace in the world, that potentially the greatest threat to that peace will be in the Pacific.

I do not mean to suggest that the Middle East is not a potential threat to the peace of the world and that there are not problems in Latin America that concern us, or in Africa and, of course, over it all, we see the great potential conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, the East-West conflict between the two superpowers.

But as far as those other areas are concerned, the possibility of finding some kind of solution, I think, is potentially greater than it is in the Asian area.

Pursuing that line of reasoning a bit further then, I would like to put it in a more positive sense: When we look at the problems in Asia, the threat to peace that is presented by the growing power of Communist China, the belligerence of North Korea and North Vietnam, we should not let that obscure the great promise that is here.

As I have often said, the fastest rate of growth in the world is occurring in non-Communist Asia. Japan, in the last 10 years, has tripled its GNP [gross national product], South Korea has doubled its GNP; Taiwan has doubled its GNP; Thailand has doubled its GNP. The same is true of Singapore and of Malaysia.

The record in some of the other countries is not as impressive. ...

So, what I am trying to suggest is this: As we look at Asia, it poses, in my view, over the long haul, looking down to the end of the century, the greatest threat to the peace of the world, and, for that reason the United States should continue to play a significant role. It also poses, it seems to me, the greatest hope for progress in the world—progress in the world because of the ability, the resources, the ability of the people, the resources physically that are available in this part of the world. And for these reasons, I think we need policies that will see that we play a part in a part that is appropriate to the conditions that we will find.

Now, one other point I would make … [is] that national pride is becoming a major factor, regional pride is becoming a major factor.

The second factor is one that is going to, I believe, have a major impact on the future of Asia, and it is something that we must take into account. Asians will say in every country that we visit that they do not want to be dictated to from the outside, Asia for the Asians. And that is what we want, and that is the role we should play. We should assist, but we should not dictate.

At this time, the political and economic plans that they are gradually developing are very hopeful. We will give assistance to those plans. We, of course, will keep the treaty commitments that we have.

But as far as our role is concerned, we must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam.

This is going to be a difficult line to follow. It is one, however, that I think, with proper planning, we can develop.

TRIP TO ROMANIA

[3.] One word about Romania...

I do not believe that the President of the United States should be able to accept an invitation to visit a Western European country, but should automatically have to decline an invitation to visit an Eastern European country.

I have said that this is an era, I hope, of negotiation rather than confrontation. It will be more difficult, of course, to develop the communication with Eastern European Communist countries than with the Western European countries, but I think it is time that a beginning be made.

We will have discussions of bilateral issues with President [Nicolae] Ceausescu, the problems of Europe, East-West relations. But this trip under no circumstances should be interpreted as an affront to the Soviet Union or as a move toward China.

It will, if it works out, I trust, set the stage for more openings of this type with countries in Eastern Europe where it would be mutually beneficial to the United States and the other country involved.

QUESTIONS

U.S. MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN ASIA

[4.] Q. Mr. President, sir, on the question of U.S. military relationships in Asia, if I may ask a hypothetical question: If a leader of one of the countries with which we have had close military relationships, either through SEATO or in Vietnam, should say, "Well, you are pulling out of Vietnam with your troops, we
can read in the newspapers. How can we know that you will remain to play a significant role as you say you wish to do in security arrangements in Asia?"

What kind of an approach can you take to that question?

THE PRESIDENT. I have already indicated that the answer to that question is not an easy one—not easy because we will be greatly tempted when that question is put to us to indicate that if any nation desires the assistance of the United States militarily in order to meet an internal or external threat, we will provide it.

However, I believe that the time has come when the United States, in our relations with all of our Asian friends, be quite emphatic on two points: One, that we will keep our treaty commitments, our treaty commitments, for example, with Thailand under SEATO; but, two, that as far as the problems of internal security are concerned, as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.

[6.] Q. Mr. President, you mentioned that you hoped that your meetings in Romania would open the way to other meetings involving Eastern Europe. Is it your hope that you would eventually be invited to Moscow to talk with the Russians perhaps within the next 6 months or so?

THE PRESIDENT. As far as any meeting with the Soviet Union is concerned, summit meeting, I have stated my position previously. And I think it would be well to restate it again.

I do not believe that any summit meeting with the Soviet Union is useful unless a subject of major interest to both powers is to be discussed with some promise of finding a solution or at least making progress on that particular problem.

... 

[10.] Q. Mr. President, you mentioned that you felt that perhaps 5 years or 10 years from now the Asian nations could collectively take care of their regional security problems. What is our policy to be in the meantime if a Vietnam-type situation does occur?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I would rather not speculate about one occurring. Each of these countries, as you, of course, know from your studying the background materials and as you will note when you visit it, poses an entirely different question. I would simply say we are going to handle each country on a case-by-case basis but attempting to avoid that creeping involvement which eventually simply submerges you—incidentally, I don't say that critically of how we got into Vietnam, but I do know that we can learn from past experience, and we must avoid that kind of involvement in the future.

Let me put it this way. I recall in 1964 some advice that I got from Ayub Khan, who was then the President of Pakistan. This was before the United States had any significant troop commitment in Vietnam. I asked him what his view was as to what our role should be. He said, "Well, the role of the United States in Vietnam or the Philippines or Thailand or any of these countries which have internal subversion is to help them fight the war but not fight the war for them." Now, that, of course, is a good general principle, one which we would hope would be our policy generally throughout the world.

Q. Both in the military and the nonmilitary. There are really two parts to this assistance problem, the economic part and the military part. And I was wondering from your discussion whether you would see us having a greater expenditure and a greater involvement in those respects or a lessened involvement as we look down the road.

THE PRESIDENT. What I would see would be that the military involvement, the military assistance, military aid programs and the rest, and particularly the commitment of military personnel—that that type of program would recede.

However, as far as economic programs are concerned, and particularly those of a multilateral character—and here we have some new ideas that we will be expanding on in the months ahead—I would say that the level of U.S. activity would be adequate to meet the challenge as it develops, because it is very much in our interest in terms of economic assistance, economic assistance through loans and other programs, to help build the economies of free Asia.

Q. Could you give us your evaluation of Red China's economic-political capability of inspiring further wars of liberation in the Asian nations? Are they able to continue that?

THE PRESIDENT. Red China's capacity in this respect is much less than it was 5 years ago, even 10 years ago. Because of its internal problems, Red China is not nearly as effective in exporting revolution as it was then. I think a pretty good indication of that is the minimal role that Red China is playing in Vietnam as compared with the Soviet Union.

Three years ago, Red China was furnishing over 50 percent of the military equipment, the hardware, for the North Vietnamese. Now it is approximately 80-20 the other way around.

There may be other reasons for that coming about, but part of it is that Red China has enough problems within.

[16.] Q. Mr. President, sir, when you say that the United States is going to continue to play a major role in Asia, that this is one message that you intend to take with you on this trip, my impression, from the thrust of your remarks today, is that another message is no more Vietnams. Is that impression correct, sir?

THE PRESIDENT. Certainly the objective of any American administration would be to avoid another war like Vietnam any place in the world. You may recall—and, of course, it was called campaign oratory, I said it and so did my opponent, Mr. [Hubert H.] Humphrey, during the campaign—that we should develop a policy that would avoid other Vietnams.
I realize it is very easy to say that. I will be quite candid when I admit that to develop the policies to avoid that is taking an enormous amount of my time and those of my associates. But what we can do is to learn from the mistakes of the past. I believe that we have, if we examine what happened in Vietnam—how we became so deeply involved—that we have a good chance of avoiding that kind of involvement in the future.

President Nixon’s Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, November 3, 1969

Good evening, my fellow Americans:
Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world—the war in Vietnam. I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.

…

How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration?
What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefield in Vietnam?
What choices do we have if we are to end the war?
What are the prospects for peace?

Now, let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20.

—The war had been going on for 4 years.
—31,000 Americans had been killed in action.
—The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule.
—540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number.
—No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.
—The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad.

In view of these circumstances there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces. From a political standpoint this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat which would be the result of my action on him and come out as the Peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war.

But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in America and in the world.

Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war.

The great question is: How can we win America’s peace?

…

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.

For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before.

…

For the United States, this first defeat in our Nation’s history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the world.

Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.

…

For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.

—A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.
—Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.
—This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.

For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefield.

In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.

—We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within 1 year.
—We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.
—We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the elections.
—We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings.
—Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.

We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized, in January, that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.

…
But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago and since this administration came into office on January 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table. Well now, who is at fault? It has become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. The obstacle is the other side’s absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace... There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi’s deciding to negotiate, to negotiate seriously...

Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front.

At the time we launched our search for peace I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace—a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July, 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine—a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy. In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: “When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them.”

Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody’s business—not just America’s business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace...

The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird’s visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces. In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams’ orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.

And now we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.

After 5 years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam—including 20 percent of all of our combat forces.

The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities for our American troops.

Two other significant developments have occurred since this administration took office.

–Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year.

–Most important—United States casualties have declined during the last 2 months to the lowest point in 3 years.

Let me now turn to our program for the future.

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid. Along with this optimistic estimate, I must-in all candor-leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.

However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point.

Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy, which as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I am making in meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.

My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war.

–I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.

–Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if necessary—a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.

I have chosen this second course.
I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.

In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading: “Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home.”

Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view. But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.

For almost 200 years, the policy of this Nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this Nation has no future as a free society.

... And so tonight-to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans-I ask for your support.

I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.

Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.

Fifty years ago, in this room and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: “This is the war to end war.” His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard realities of great power politics and Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.

Tonight I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars. But I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated—the goal of a just and lasting peace.

As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path to that goal and then leading the Nation along it.

I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.

Thank you and goodnight.
Toasts of the President and Premier Chou En-lai of China at a Banquet Honoring the Premier in Peking, February 25, 1972

Mr. Prime Minister and our very distinguished guests from the People's Republic of China and the United States of America:

It is a great privilege while we are guests in your country to be able to welcome you and the Chinese who are present here as our guests this evening.

On behalf of Mrs. Nixon and all of the members of our official party, I want to express our deep appreciation for the boundless and gracious hospitality which you have extended to us.

As you know, it is the custom in our country that the members of the press have the right to speak for themselves and that no one in government can speak for them. But I am sure that all those from the American press who are here tonight will grant me the rare privilege of speaking for the press in extending their appreciation to you and your government for the many courtesies you have extended to them.

You have made it possible for the story of this historic visit to be read, seen, and heard by more people all over the world than on any previous occasion in history.

Yesterday, along with hundreds of millions of viewers on television, we saw what is truly one of the wonders of the world, the Great Wall. As I walked along the Wall, I thought of the sacrifices that went into building it; I thought of what it showed about the determination of the Chinese people to retain their independence throughout their long history; I thought about the fact that the Wall tells us that China has a great history and that the people who built this wonder of the world also have a great future.

The Great Wall is no longer a wall dividing China from the rest of the world, but it is a reminder of the fact that there are many walls still existing in the world which divide nations and peoples.

The Great Wall is also a reminder that for almost a generation there has been a wall between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America.

In these past 4 days we have begun the long process of removing that wall between us. We began our talks recognizing that we have great differences, but we are determined that those differences not prevent us from living together in peace.

You believe deeply in your system, and we believe just as deeply in our system. It is not our common beliefs that have brought us together here, but our common interests and our common hopes, the interest that each of us has to maintain our independence and the security of our peoples and the hope that each of us has to build a new world order in which nations and peoples with different systems and different values can live together in peace, respecting one another while disagreeing with one another, letting history rather than the battlefield be the judge of their different ideas.

Mr. Prime Minister, you have noted that the plane which brought us here is named the Spirit of '76. Just this week, we have celebrated in America the birth of George Washington, the Father of our Country, who led America to independence in our Revolution and served as our first President.

He bade farewell at the close of his term with these words to his countrymen: "Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all."

It is in that spirit, the spirit of '76, that I ask you to rise and join me in a toast to Chairman Mao, to Premier Chou, to the people of our two countries, and to the hope of our children that peace and harmony can be the legacy of our generation to theirs.
Good evening. I have asked for this radio and television time tonight for the purpose of announcing that we today have concluded an agreement to end the war and bring peace with honor in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia.

The following statement is being issued at this moment in Washington and Hanoi:

At 12:30 Paris time today [Tuesday], January 23, 1973, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was initialed by Dr. Henry Kissinger on behalf of the United States, and Special Adviser Le Duc Tho on behalf of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The agreement will be formally signed by the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam on January 27, 1973, at the International Conference Center in Paris.

The cease-fire will take effect at 2400 Greenwich Mean Time, January 27, 1973. The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam express the hope that this agreement will insure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

That concludes the formal statement.

Throughout the years of negotiations, we have insisted on peace with honor. In my addresses to the Nation from this room of January 25 and May 8, 1972 I set forth the goals that we considered essential for peace with honor.

In the settlement that has now been agreed to, all the conditions that I laid down then have been met. A cease-fire, internationally supervised, will begin at 7 p.m., this Saturday, January 27, Washington time. Within 60 days from this Saturday, all Americans held prisoners of war throughout Indochina will be released. There will be the fullest possible accounting for all of those who are missing in action.

During the same 60-day period, all American forces will be withdrawn from South Vietnam.

The people of South Vietnam have been guaranteed the right to determine their own future, without outside interference.

By joint agreement, the full text of the agreement and the protocols to carry it out, will be issued tomorrow.

Throughout these negotiations we have been in the closest consultation with President Thieu and other representatives of the Republic of Vietnam. This settlement meets the goals and has the full support of President Thieu and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, as well as that of our other allies who are affected.

The United States will continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam.

We shall continue to aid South Vietnam within the terms of the agreement and we shall support efforts by the people of South Vietnam to settle their problems peacefully among themselves.

We must recognize that ending the war is only the first step toward building the peace. All parties must now see to it that this is a peace that lasts, and also a peace that heals, and a peace that not only ends the war in Southeast Asia, but contributes to the prospects of peace in the whole world.

This will mean that the terms of the agreement must be scrupulously adhered to. We shall do everything the agreement requires of us and we shall expect the other parties to do everything it requires of them. We shall also expect other interested nations to help insure that the agreement is carried out and peace is maintained.

As this long and very difficult war ends, I would like to address a few special words to each of those who have been parties in the conflict.

First, to the people and Government of South Vietnam: By your courage, by your sacrifice, you have won the precious right to determine your own future and you have developed the strength to defend that right. We look forward to working with you in the future, friends in peace as we have been allies in war.

To the leaders of North Vietnam: As we have ended the war through negotiations, let us now build a peace of reconciliation. For our part, we are prepared to make a major effort to help achieve that goal. But just as reciprocity was needed to end the war, so, too, will it be needed to build and strengthen the peace.

To the other major powers that have been involved even indirectly: Now is the time for mutual restraint so that the peace we have achieved can last.

And finally, to all of you who are listening, the American people: Your steadfastness in supporting our insistence on peace with honor has made peace with honor possible. I know that you would not have wanted that peace jeopardized. With our secret negotiations at the sensitive stage they were in during this recent period, for me to have discussed publicly our efforts to secure peace would not only have violated our understanding with North Vietnam, it would have seriously harmed and possibly destroyed the chances for peace. Therefore, I know that you now can understand why, during these past several weeks, I have not made any public statements about those efforts.

The important thing was not to talk about peace, but to get peace and to get the right kind of peace. This we have done.

Now that we have achieved an honorable agreement, let us be proud that America did not settle for a peace that would have betrayed our allies, that would have abandoned our prisoners of war, or that would have ended the war for us but would have continued the war for the 50 million people of Indochina. Let us be proud of the 2 1/2 million young Americans who served in Vietnam, who served with honor and distinction in one of the most selfless enterprises in the history of nations. And let us be proud of those who sacrificed, who gave their lives so that the people of South Vietnam might live in freedom and so that the world might live in peace.

In particular, I would like to say a word to some of the bravest people I have ever met—the wives, the children, the families of our prisoners of war and the missing in action. When others called on us to settle on any terms, you had the courage to stand for the right kind of peace so that those who died and those who suffered would not have died and suffered in vain, and so that, where this generation knew war, the next generation would know peace.

Nothing means more to me at this moment than the fact that your long vigil is coming to an end.

Just yesterday, a great American, who once occupied this office, died. In his life President [Lyndon B.] Johnson endured the vilification of those who sought to portray him as a man of war. But there was nothing he cared about more deeply than achieving a lasting peace in the world.

I remember the last time I talked with him. It was just the day after New Year’s. He spoke then of his concern with bringing peace, with making it the right kind of peace, and I was grateful that he once again expressed his support for my efforts to gain such a peace. No one would have welcomed this peace more than he.

And I know he would join me in asking for those who died and for those who live, let us consecrate this moment by resolving together to make the peace we have achieved a peace that will last.

Thank you and good evening.
Remarks on Departure for the Middle East, June 10, 1974

Mr. Vice President, members of the diplomatic corps, members of the Cabinet, and all of our friends who have been so gracious to come here to see us off on what we hope and believe will be another journey for peace:

It seems just a little while ago that we saw many of you when we left in 1972, first, on a trip to the People's Republic of China early in that year, and later, on a trip to the Soviet Union. Both of those journeys were ones that had a profound impact, not only on the relations between the nations involved but also on building a structure of peace for the whole world.

This trip will take us to a part of the world that has known nothing but war over the past 30 to 40 years. As we go to five countries, four of which have never been visited by an American President before, we realize that one trip is not going to solve differences that are very deep, that go back in some cases many years and in some cases centuries. But we also realize that a beginning has to be made. As a great philosopher once said, the beginning is often the most important part of the work. And the beginning has been made toward a different relation and a better relation between the nations in that area.

We have been proud to play a part in that beginning. The disengagement between Israel and Egypt, and later between Israel and Syria, on the part of Secretary of State Kissinger and others and that the United States played, is one that we can be proud of. But now as I go there, it will provide an opportunity to reaffirm support for the initiatives that have been undertaken to explore ways that we can have new and better relations between the United States and each nation in the area, and also to explore ways in which those nations in the area may have better relations with each other and build toward the permanent and lasting and just and equitable peace that all of them, we know, want and, certainly, that we want.

As we go, above everything else, we will bring to all the people that we will see, most of whom we will not have a chance to meet personally—but we will bring them, we know, from the hearts of all Americans, whatever their partisan affiliation, the best wishes, the hopes for peace and for friendship, not only between our countries and theirs but among all countries in that area. And with that kind of backing, with that kind of message from the people of the United States, we believe this trip, like the other journeys we have taken, will contribute to that lasting peace to which we, as Americans, are so deeply dedicated.

Thank you.
Address to the Nation on Returning From the' Soviet Union, July 3, 1974

MR. VICE PRESIDENT, I want to express appreciation, not only on my own behalf but also on Mrs. Nixon's behalf, for your very gracious and generous words.

Governor Curtis and Mrs. Curtis and to all of our friends here in Maine, I want to thank you for giving us such a splendid welcome as we return.

I know that as I see cars parked what a real effort it is to come out to an air base. It took a lot of time and we appreciate that effort, and we thank you very much.

To each and every one of you, and to perhaps millions who are listening on television and radio, I can assure you of one thing, and that is, it is always good to come home to America. That is particularly so when one comes home from a journey that has advanced the cause of peace in the world.

We left Moscow earlier today, and as we did, there were hundreds of United States and Soviet flags flying side by side, and I thought of the fact that tomorrow millions of Americans will be flying the flag from their homes on the Fourth of July. And you will be flying those flags proudly because of what it means in your own lives and in our lives and also because of what our flag means in the world. We can be very proud of the American flag all over the world today.

I thought also of how much more that flag means to the world because of the role the United States has been playing in building a structure of peace from which all nations can benefit, a role which was symbolized so dramatically by those flags flying side by side in the Soviet Union.

Our generation, which has known so much war and destruction--four wars in this century--now has an opportunity to build for the next generation a structure of peace in which we hope war will have no part whatever.

This is the great task before us, and this is the greatest task in which any people could be summoned. In the past month, Mrs. Nixon and I have traveled over 25,000 miles, visiting nine countries in Western Europe and the Middle East, as well as, of course, the Soviet Union. The visit to each of these areas had a separate purpose, but in a larger sense, all of these visits were directed toward the same purpose, and they are all interacted and interconnected.

Among the nations of the Middle East, among those of the Western Alliance, and between the United States and the Soviet Union, new patterns are emerging, patterns that hold out to the world the brightest hopes in a generation for a just and lasting peace that all of us can enjoy.

In the Middle East a generation of bitter hostility, punctuated by four wars, is now giving way to a new spirit in which both sides are searching earnestly for the keys to a peaceful resolution of their differences.

In the Western Alliance, 25 years after NATO was founded, there has been given a new birth, a new life to that organization as embodied in the Declaration on Atlantic Relations that we signed 7 days ago in Brussels at the NATO heads-of-government meeting before going on to Moscow. In the series of United States-Soviet summits that we began in 1972, we have been charting a new relationship between the world's two most powerful nations, a new relationship which is designed to insure that these two nations will work together in peace, rather than to confront each other in an atmosphere of distrust and tension which could lead, if it were not corrected, to war.

At this year's summit, we advanced further the relationship that we began 2 years ago in Moscow and that we continued at last year's summit in the United States. In the communiqué we issued earlier today in Moscow, both sides committed themselves to this goal, the imperative necessity of making the process of improving United States-Soviet relations irreversible.

This sums up what the whole broad pattern of our expanding range of agreements is designed to achieve, to make the improvement not just a one-day headline, not just a one-day sensation, but a continuing, irreversible process that will build its own momentum and will develop into a permanent peace.

At this year's meeting, we reached a number of important agreements, both in the field of arms limitation and also in the field of peaceful cooperation. In the field of arms limitation, three of the agreements we reached are of special note. One of those involves the exceedingly difficult question of offensive strategic nuclear arms, and this base, as we know, is involved in that particular kind of operation.

Two years ago, we signed an interim agreement on offensive strategic weapons covering the 5-year period until 1977. This year, we decided that this interim agreement should be followed by a new agreement to cover the period until 1985. We agreed that this should deal with both quantitative and qualitative aspects of strategic nuclear weapons, that it should be concluded well above and well before, I should say, the expiration of the present agreement.

We also agreed that the extensive work we have already done toward hammering out such a long-range agreement should go forward at Geneva in the immediate future on the basis of instructions growing out of our talks at the highest level during the past week.

Now, the two sides have not yet reached a final accord on the terms of an agreement. This is a difficult and a very complex subject, but we did bring such an accord significantly closer, and we committed both sides firmly to the resolution of our remaining differences.

The second important arms control agreement that we reached deals with the antiballistic missile systems. You will recall that 2 years ago we agreed that each country should be limited to two ABM sites. The agreement we signed earlier today in Moscow strengthens and extends the scope of that earlier measure by restricting each country to one ABM site.
And then the third arms limitation agreement deals with underground testing of nuclear weapons. It extends significantly the earlier steps toward limiting tests that began with the 1963 test-ban treaty. That original treaty barred the signatories from conducting tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. Today, we concluded a new treaty that for the first time will also cover tests underground. It will ban both the Soviet Union and the United States, after March 31, 1976, from conducting any underground test of weapons above a certain explosive power, and it will also require both countries to keep tests of weapons below that power to the very minimum number.

This is not only another major step toward bringing the arms race under control, it is also a significant additional step toward reducing the number of nuclear and thermonuclear explosions in the world.

Now, arms limitations, of course, are enormously and crucially important, but the work of these summit meetings is much broader, just as the nature of the new United States-Soviet relationship is much broader. This year, the important new agreements we reached in the area of peaceful progress included new programs for cooperation between our two countries in energy, in housing, in health, and also an agreement on long-term economic cooperation designed to facilitate increasing mutually beneficial trade between our two countries.

The significance of these agreements goes beyond the advances each will bring to its particular field, just as the significance of our summit meetings goes beyond the individual agreements themselves. With this growing network of agreements, we are creating new habits of cooperation and new patterns of consultation, and we are also giving the people of the Soviet Union, as well as our own people in the United States, not just a negative, but a positive stake in peace.

We are creating a stable new base on which to build peace, not just through the fear of war but through sharing the benefits of peace, of working together for a better life for the people of both of our countries.

The United States-Soviet agreements at the summit contribute importantly to the structure of peace we are trying to build between our two countries and in the world. The continued strength of the Western Alliance is also an essential and major element of that structure and so, too, is the development of a new pattern of relationships and a new attitude toward peace in areas of tension such as the Middle East.

The fact that the NATO meeting in Brussels came midway between the trip to the Middle East and the one to the Soviet Union is symbolic of the central role that the Western Alliance must play in building the new structure of peace.

It is clearly understood by the leaders of the Soviet Union that in forging the new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, we will not proceed at the expense of traditional allies. On the contrary, the continued strength of the Western Alliance is essential to the success and to the process in which we are engaged of maintaining and developing the new relationship to the Soviet Union.

The development of that new relationship provides an opportunity to deepen the unity of the Western Alliance. We must not neglect our alliances, and we must not assume that our new relationship with the Soviet Union allows us to neglect our own military strength. It is because we are strong that such a relationship that we are now developing is possible.

In his first annual message to the Congress, George Washington said to be prepared for war is one of the most effective means of preserving peace. That statement is true today as it was then, and that is why all of you who are serving in our Armed Forces today are actually serving in the peace forces for America and the world. We thank you for your service.

We are prepared, we in the United States, to reduce our military strength but only through a process in which that reduction is mutual and one that does not diminish the security of the United States of America. It is to that end that we have been working.

Twenty-five years ago when the NATO Treaty was signed, it was called "an act of faith in the destiny of Western Civilization." That description was prophetic as well as accurate, and now, 25 years later, we might well say the new structure of peace we are building in the world is an act of faith in the destiny of mankind. Like anything built to be permanent, that structure must be built step by careful step. It must be built solidly. It must be such a structure that those who use it will preserve it because they treasure it, because it responds to their needs, and because it reflects their hopes.

Two years ago in my report to the Congress on returning from the first of the United States-Soviet summits, I expressed the hope that historians of some future age will write of the year 1972, not that this was the year America went up to the summit and then down to the depths of the valley again, but that this was the year when America helped to lead the world up out of the lowlands of war and on to the high plateau of lasting peace.

And now, 2 years, two summits later, the realization of that hope has been brought closer. The process of peace is going steadily forward. It is strengthened by the new and expanding patterns of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is reinforced by the new vitality of our Western Alliance and bringing such encouraging results as the new turn toward peace in the Middle East.

In all of our travels to which the Vice President has referred, one message has come through more clearly than any other. We have seen millions and millions of people over these past few weeks, and from their faces as well as the words of those we have seen and the thousands we have met in every part of the world, this is the message, and that is that the desire to end war, to build peace is one that knows no national boundaries and that unites people everywhere.

Something else also comes through very loud and very clear: The people of the nations that we visited--and we saw them, as I have indicated, not only by the thousands but by the millions--want to be friends of the American people, and we reciprocate. We want to be their friends, too.

In the early years of our Nation's history, after America had won its independence, Thomas Jefferson said we act not just for ourselves alone but for the whole human race.
As we prepare tomorrow to celebrate the anniversary of that independence, the 198th anniversary, we as Americans can be proud that we have been true to Jefferson's vision and that, as a result of America's initiative, that universal goal of peace is now closer, closer not only for ourselves but for all mankind. Thank you very much and good evening.